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CRYPTOGRAPHY AND THE FIRST

AMENDMENT: THE RIGHT TO BE
UNHEARD
I. INTRODUCTION
We are familiar with the reduction in our freedoms accompanying
most technological innovations. Metal-detectors search us at the airport;
theft-sensors frisk us in the shopping mall and pagers tap us anytime
day or night.' In the age of lightning-fast computer searches, global networks and wireless communication, our most private information lies exposed to the world. 2 Cryptography, the process of using secret codes to
protect or conceal information, dramatically increases our privacy 3 and
holds the key to maintaining effective control over an ever-increasing
4
flow of data.
Although historically used by governments to wage war, 5 cryptography can limit access to information, screen electronic communications
and provide reliable identification on electronic networks.6 Services like7
pay-per-view television and remote banking depend on cryptography.
1.

Robert Lee Hotz, Demanding the Ability to Snoop, Los ANGELES TuMEs,

Oct. 3,

1993, at B1.
2. Steven Winters, Comment, The New PrivacyInterest: Electronic Mail in the Work-

place, 8 HIGH TECH. L.J. 197, 219 (1993) (citing Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court,
1988 Term-Foreword: The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARv. L. REv. 43, 96-98 (1989)). In
a recent Defense Department program, experts attacked 12,000 computer systems and succeeded in penetrating security 88% of the time. U.S. to Propose Federal Agency to Secure
Information Superhighway, WALL ST. J., June 14, 1995, at B9. The attacks went undetected 96% of the time. Id.
3. John Mintz & John Schwartz, Chipping Away at Privacy? Encryption Device
Widens Debate Over Rights of U.S. to Eavesdrop, WASH. POST, May 30, 1993, at Cl. Massachusetts representative Edward J. Markey expresses the feelings, "[i]n a digitally linked
world, where encryption is the key to privacy, banning encryption may be like banning
privacy." Id.
4. Timothy B. Lennon, Comment, The FourthAmendment's Prohibitionson Encryption Limitation: Will 1995 be Like 1984?, 58 ALB. L. REV. 467-71 (1994).
5. DAVm KAHN, THE CODEBREA ERS 190 (1967) (marking the application of the telegraph to battlefield communication in 1844 as the start of modern cryptography).
6. Shimson Berkovits, Cryptography, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHYSICAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, 3 Co-CRYP 849 (Robert A. Meyers ed., 1987).
7. Hotz, supra note 1, at Bi. On the other hand, the current electronic cash system
uses a dangerously weak form of cryptography. Don't Tell it to the Spartans (Nor,Indeed,
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Control over our personal information is essential in a free society.8
However, the thought of individual citizens exercising complete command over their own privacy alarms the government. 9 Louis Freeh, director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, worries about "too much
privacy in the wrong hands" 10 and the National Security Agency's General Counsel declares "citizens do not have a constitutional right to unbreakable encryption algorithms." 1
This Comment proposes that
current technology has made cryptography a necessary element in maintaining our constitutional right to free speech. 12 Like the printing press,
to Anyone Else), THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 18, 1995, at 82. Making an ominous prediction about
the digital economy:
[B]illions of dollars flow across the net each day ....
[O]rganized crime hires the
best hackers. Eventually someone breaks into the system, gaining the ability to
coin fake e-cash. He and his colleagues use it widely, surreptitiously to earn a lot
of real money ....
Others notice the system has been breached and the whole
world comes tumbling down.
Id.
Sooner than expected, the nightmare came true. William M. Carley & Timothy L.
O'Brien, Cyber Caper: How Citicorp System was Raided and Funds Moved Around the
World, WALL ST. J., Sept. 12, 1995, at Al. A Russian biology student penetrated Citicorp's
$500 billion-dollar-a-day network and started siphoning money. Id. The intruder moved
12 million dollars and withdrew about $400,000 in cash before being caught, all in a system
experts believed was impregnable. Id. at A16.
8. Justice Douglas foreshadowed the current crisis in his dissenting opinion in Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
We are rapidly entering the age of no privacy, where everyone is open to surveillance at all times; where there are no secrets from government. The aggressive
breaches of privacy by the Government increase by geometric proportions. Wiretapping and 'bugging' run rampant, without effective judicial or legislative control ....
The dossiers on all citizens mount in number and in size. Now they are
being put on computers so that by pressing a button all the miserable, the sick, the
suspect, the unpopular, the offbeat people of the Nation can be instantly identified. . . . These examples and many others demonstrate an alarming trend
whereby the privacy and dignity of our citizens is being whittled away by sometimes imperceptible steps. Taken individually, each step may be of little consequence. But when viewed as a whole, there begins to emerge a society quite unlike
any we have seen-a society in which government may intrude into the secret
regions of a man's life at will.
Id. at 341-43.
9. Howard Reingold, Big Brother Could be Logging On, SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER,
Apr. 27, 1994, at C2. The American government has had a long involvement with cryptography. When Aaron Burr was tried for treason before Chief Justice John Marshall, one key
piece of evidence was a coded letter sent by Burr to his military accomplice, General James
Wilkinson. KAHN, supra note 5, at 186-87. Another turncoat, Benedict Arnold, sent
messages in a code based on Blackstone's Commentaries. Id. at 177. When Thomas Jefferson served as America's first Secretary of State, he created a code which was secure enough
to be used by the United States Navy for almost two hundred years. Id. at 192-94.
10. Reingold, supra note 9.
11. G. Burgess Allison, Technology Update, LAW PRACT. MGMT., Oct. 1994, at 12.
12. The speech component of privacy essentially:
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cryptography promises to change the way we think about the exchange
13
of ideas.
The magnitude of this change coupled with a lack of understanding
has led to calls for regulation of private cryptography. 1 4 There are two
5
equally misconceived arguments for the regulation of cryptography.'
First, cryptography is not speech and therefore, not constitutionally protected at all. i s Alternatively, cryptography is speech, but the rules of
7
free speech do not apply to cryptography.'
This Comment shows that cryptography is undeniably a form of
speech. Moreover, it argues that the failure of traditional analysis to
effectively categorize cryptography is evidence that it is not simply an
extension of existing free speech concepts, but a new dimension to our
constitutional rights. Finally, this Comment proposes that like the
traditional press, the solution to the question of cryptography regulation
8
lies within the marketplace.'
II.

BACKGROUND

The concept of a free press is arguably the inevitable consequence of
the uncontrolled spread of printing technology.' 9 The introduction of
printing in England in 1476 led immediately to government licensing of
[Pirovides the individual with the opportunities he needs for sharing confidences
and intimacies with those he trusts-spouse, 'family,' personal friends, and close

associates at work. The individual discloses because he knows that his confidences will be held, and because he knows that breach of confidence violates social
norms in a civilized society ....
ALAN F. WESTIN, PRiVACY AND FREEDOM 33-38 (1967).
13. THOMAS L. TEDFORD, FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 13-16, 322 (2d ed.

1993).
14. Hotz, supra note 1, at B1.
15. Traditional First Amendment law does not fit cryptography. When faced with such
a situation, the analysis could declare the example a monster and place it outside the definition of speech. LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE CONSTrrurION

87-91 (1991). As an alternative, analysis could hold cryptography to be speech, but that it
is a special case since so few rules apply. Id. A better solution would be to recognize that
our definition of speech improperly excludes coded data and that it should adjust to this
new definition. Id.
16. Id.
17. Hotz, supra note 1, at B1.
18. Duncan M. Davidson, Common Law, Uncommon Software, 47 U. PrI'r. L. REv.
1037, 1040 (1986); Symposium, Electronic Communication and Legal Change, Computer

Network Abuse, 6 HARv. J.L. &TECH. 307, 310-13 (1993) (concluding that the best means of
maintaining information security is to establish a properly functioning computer security
market). Predictably, a USA Today poll found that only 6% of Internet users wanted the
federal government to administer it. James Kim, Internet Users Favor Self-Regulation,
USA TODAY, Sept. 12, 1995 at B1.
19. TEDFORD, supra note 13, at 322.
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printing presses.20 As literacy spread and the fear of an informed public
subsided, these prior restraints disappeared. 2 1 As a result, Blackstone
defined free speech as that which existed in the absence of prior restraints. 22 Just as the technology of printing ingrained itself into the
fabric of our society, 2 3 cryptography will play an indispensable roll in the

digital age.
Cryptography, the craft of communicating in secret code, 24 is as old
as written language. 25 The alphabet, for example, is simply a code we all
understand. 2 6 The purpose of a secret code is to limit access to the contents of a message to a select group.2 7 In other words, we use secret
codes to keep secrets.
A.

SYMMETRIC CRYPTOGRAPHY

Examined mathematically, there are two families of cryptographic
systems. 28 Most familiar are symmetric cryptographic systems. 29 Both
systems change one group of readable symbols into a second set of unreadable symbols. 30 Imagine a code which substitutes the original letters of a word with the letters which come two places earlier in the
alphabet. In this manner, the message, "Free Speech" becomes "gsff
qffdi."3 1 The operation of substituting the letters is known as the "key"
to the cipher. 32 In symmetric cryptography, the sender uses this key to
encode his message and the receiver uses the same key to decode. 3 3 As
long as the key remains a secret, it is impossible to read the message and
34
the secret is safe.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id. at 6.
Id.
4 WiLLiAM BLACKSTONE, CoMMviENTAuEs 151-52.
TEDFORD, supra note 13, at 13-16.
KAHN, supra note 5, at xiii.

25. HAMILTON NIcKELs, CODEMASTER: SECRETS OF MAKING AND BREAnKG CODES 5
(1990).
26. KAHN, supra note 5, at 902 (arguing that the system of writing the ancient Greeks
developed was a response to their encounter with a more complex code, Egyptian
hieroglyphics).
27. MICHAEL KURLAND, THE SpyMAsTERs's HANDBOOK 5 (1988).
28. Berkovits, supra note 6, at 849; see generally BRUCE SCHNEIER, APPLIED CRYVTOGRApHy (1994) (surveying modern computer cryptography).
29. Berkovits, supra note 6, at 849.
30. Id. The set M is the actual message and is called the plaintext, while C, the encoded message, is known as ciphertext. Id. The entire operation is called a cipher. Id.
31. See KURLAND, supra note 27, at 151 (giving a straightforward explanation of substitution ciphers).
32. MICHAEL KURLAND, THE SPYMAsTER'S HANDBOOK 151 (1988).
33. Id.
34. Id.
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The practical weakness of symmetric ciphers is keeping the key a
secret. 3 5 These systems require that both the sender and the receiver
know the solution. 36 This means that at some point the parties must
exchange unencoded information about the key3 7 and thus the communication is always vulnerable to interception. 38
Aside from interception, a more determined outsider can find the solution to symmetric ciphers by engaging in a series of experiments. 39 Attackers may try many different operations on the encoded message,
hoping one attempt will reveal an intelligible message. 40 The time and
effort necessary to mount this kind of attack is known as the "work factor" of a cipher, and rates its relative security. 4 1 One of the most sophis42
ticated symmetric ciphers, the Data Encryption Standard ("DES"),
uses a 56-bit key.4 3 To find the right key, an attacker is faced with seventy quadrillion combinations. 44 The work factor associated with DES
45
prevents anyone armed with paper and pencil from ever finding a key.
Using an ordinary desktop computer, however, an attacker could try
all possible keys relatively quickly. 46 The rapid increase in computer
35. Id.
36. See KuND, supra note 27, at 851.
37. KuRLAND, supra note 27, at 851.
38. KuRLAND, supra note 27, at 851.
39. KAHN, supra note 5, at 399 (crediting Gilbert S. Vernam with creating virtually
unbreakable code in 1917).
40. Berkovits, supra note 6, at 853. The search for keys through trial and error is
known as an "exhaustive search" style of attack. Id. Other types of direct attacks include
statistical attacks based on language usage, analytical attacks based on flaws in a cryptography system and traffic analysis which looks at the identity of the users. Id.
However, the difficulty of any given method of attack depends on what part of the
message the cryptanalyist holds. Id. at 853. While an attacker in possession of ciphertext
is generally harmless, one who holds some ciphertext and its companion plaintext is far
more threatening. Id. The most dangerous attacker is one who can selectively examine
specific segments of ciphertext and its corresponding plaintext. Id.
41. Berkovits, supra note 6, at 852. Since single-key systems rely on trial and error for
security, they actually require shorter keys than asymmetric systems to achieve the same
work factor. Id. Therefore, the work factor of a cipher is generally a multiple of the system's key length. Daniel Pearl, Encryption-SoftwarePlan Presented Using 'Keys' Held by
Escrow Agents, WALL ST. J., Aug. 18, 1995, at A3. Ominously, a French hacker recently
cracked a 40-bit key, and even longer keys will become vulnerable soon. Berkovits, supra
note 6, at 853.
42. Berkovits, supra note 6, at 854-55. An excellent directory ofcryptography products
is available on WWW Page: Pointer to CryptographicSoftware, URL httpJ/www.cs.hut.fi/
crypto/software.html, created by Tatu Ylonen, viewed Nov. 18, 1995.
43. Id. DES uses eight nulls to check for errors or tampering in the transmitted
message in addition to the 56-bit key. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. WALDO T. BoYD, COMPUTER CRYPrOLOGY 49 (1988).
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processing speeds 47 led researchers in 1977 to predict that DES would be
unable to protect information past the year 1990.48

B.

ASYMMETRIC CRYPTOGRAPHY

In 1978, Ronald Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Leonard Adleman developed a revolutionary new style of cipher. 4 9 Named after its inventors,
51
50
the RSA system employs a logarithmic function to produce two keys.
By choosing a specific base number and an exponent, a sender can create
a key that can be split between an encrypting function and a decrypting
function. 52 Therefore, a party who wants to receive messages can publish part of the key 53 and keep the other part 5 4 a secret. With the public
half,55 a sender may encrypt messages, but only the person with the private key can decrypt them. This ability to receive messages without a
loss to security is the genius of asymmetric cryptography.
In the summer of 1990, network users discovered the potential 5of6
asymmetric cryptography in a program called "Pretty Good Privacy."
47. Vic Sussman, The Devil of the Internet, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Apr. 17, 1995,
at 12.
48. Berkovits, supra note 6, at 855.
49. Berkovits, supra note 6, at 856.
50. Berkovits, supra note 6, at 856. A logarithm is a mathematical expression which
raises a base number by an exponent to produce a given, third number. WEBSTER'S II NEW
RIVERSIDE UNIVERSITY DIcTIONARY 702 (1st ed. 1984).
51. Francis Litterio, WWW Page: The Mathematical Guts of RSA, URL: http: //
draco.centerline.com:8080/-franl/pgp, created by Francis Litterio, viewed Nob. 18, 1995.
Litterio simplifies the mathematics of RSA:
1. Find P and Q, two large (e.g., 1024-bit) prime numbers.
2. Choose E such that E and (P-1)(Q-1) are relatively prime, which means they
have no prime factors in common. E does not have to be prime, but it must be odd.
(P-1)(Q-1) can't be prime because it's an even number.
3. Compute D such that (DE-1) is evenly divisible by (P-1)(Q-1). Mathematicians
write this as DE mod (P-1XQ-1), and they call D the multiplicative inverse of E.
4. The encryption function is encrypt(T) = (TAE) mod PQ, where T is the plaintext
(a positive integer) and 'A' indicates exponentiation.
5. The decryption function is decrypt(C) = (CAD) mod PQ, where C is the ciphertext
(a positive integer) and 'A' indicates exponentiation.
Id. Litterio cautions that no one has proven that RSA does not have a mathematical weakness. Id.
52. Berkovits, supra note 6, at 855.
53. Litterio, supra note 51. The public part of the key is (PQE). Id. Starting with only
(PQ,E) an attacker cannot easily calculate D, P or Q and therefore a user can openly distribute the public half of the key. Id.
54. Litterio, supra note 51. The private part of the key is D. Id.
55. Berkovits, supra note 6, at 850.
56. William M. Bulkeley, CipherProbe: Popularity Overseas of Encryption Code has
U.S. Worried, WALL ST. J. EUROPE, May 2, 1994, at Al. A few of the Internet sites offering
PGP can be found on WWW Page: M.I.T. Home Page, URL: httpJ/www.mit.ed/network/
pgp.html, viewed Nov 18, 1995; see also, WWW Page: Mantis Home Page, URL: http'/
www.mantis.co.uk/ pgp/pgp.html, viewed Nov. 18, 1995.
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Anonymously posted on the Internet, 5 7 the program produces its code
using a RSA system. 58 The program, known as "PGP"59 to users, was an
immediate hit and it is still enthusiastically copied, 60 modified 6 ' and dis62
tributed all over the world.

C.

THE POTENTIAL ADVANTAGES

The development of asymmetric encryption systems is not just a
breakthrough in theoretical cryptography. Asymmetric systems allow
businesses to exploit the economic potential of computer networks.6 3 On
the current networks, building a business on the Internet "is like trying
to build a bank without walls." 64 Asymmetric cryptography provides
tools for both security6 5 and identification. 66 Businesses using asymmetric systems can deliver their products to consumers and protect their
57. Bulkeley, supra note 56.
58. Bulkeley, supra note 56.
59. See WWW page: Frequently Asked Questions About Pretty Good Privacy, URL:
httpY/www.cis.tezcat.com/web/security, created by Andre Bacard, viewed Nov. 18, 1995.
60. Id. Zimmermann also distributes a cryptography product called the PGPfone
which encodes ordinary telephone conversations. Pretty Good Phone Privacy, NEWSWEEK,
Aug. 28, 1995, at 10. PGPfone may be located on the internet using WWW Page: Pointer to
Cryptography Software, URL: httpJ/www.cs.hut.fi/crypto/software.html, created by Tatu
Ylonen, viewed Nov. 18, 1995.
61. Id. PGP 1.0 uses RSA to protect DES keys during transmission, but employs DES
to protect the body of the message. Id. PGP 2.0 and later versions use the Improved Data
Encryption Algorithm ("IDEA") for the message. Id. An on-line warehouse of cryptography
programs, such as IDEA, can be found at FTP: ftp.dsi.unimi.it; login: anonymous; password: e-mail address; directory: pub/security/crypt/code/, accessed Apr. 28, 1995. The most
recent commercial version of PGP is 2.6.2 and the most recent freeware version is 2.7.1.
Litterio, supra note 51. A draft of PGP 3.0 is also beginning to circulate. See also WWW
Page: Pointer, supra note 42.
62. WWW Page: Pointer, supra note 42.
63. Mark L. Gordon & Diana J.P. McKenzie, A Lawyer's Roadmap of the Information
Superhighway, 13 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 177, 182 (1995) (cataloging the
various computer networks). Other networks include the National Information Infrastructure Testbed ("NIIT"), the National Research and Education Network ("NREN"), and private networks such as Prodigy, CompuServe, and America Online. Id. at 181-84. The
networks also go by popular names such as the Net, the Web, the Cloud, the Matrix, the
Metaverse, the Datasphere and, of course, the Information Superhighway. Philip ElmerDeWitt, Welcome to Cyberspace, Tura,Spring 1995, at 4. Today approximately forty million
people around the world have access to the Internet. Id. at 9.
64. Nate Zelnick, Keeping Business Safe on the Internet, PC MAGAZnE, Apr. 25, 1995,
at 31 (outlining AT&Ts Information Vending Encryption System ("IVES") chip).
65. David Post, Encryption-It's Not Just for Spies Anymore, AM. LAw., Dec. 1994, at
106 (describing the Internet as "Dodge City"). Although 30,000 companies have Internet
addresses, they are "simply showing their faces" because of the lack of security on the network. Id.
66. See Jill Gambon, SignatureLaws Near--California,Washington May Follow Utah
Lead on Digital Signatures,INFORMATION WEEK, May 8, 1995 at 24. The pioneering legislation in this area is the Utah Digital Signature Act, UTAH CODE §§ 46-3-101 et. seq. (1995).
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property in ways simply not possible under conventional systems. In essence, asymmetric cryptography gives the networks the walls they des67
perately need.
Cheap and convenient, asymmetric cryptography is not simply an
economic device. It creates a new kind of speech-based privacy. 68 In
Thailand, Guatemala and El Salvador, human rights activists are able to
conduct work they otherwise would not risk through the use of cryptography. 69 During the Tiananmen Square uprising, Chinese dissidents
used the cipher to communicate with the outside world. 70 The 1994 coup
attempt in Russia generated a message, "[ilf dictatorship takes over Rus71
sia . . . PGP . . . will help democratic people if necessary. Thanks."
More ordinary users of PGP include an author who encrypts his work
before sending it to his editor and an astronomer who encrypts his observations to prevent others from claim-jumping. 7 2 Around the world, cryp73
tography is proving vital in protecting freedom.
D.

THE DRAWBACKS

Unlimited privacy has a dark side as well. 74 For example, cryptography prevented the Los Angeles police from reading the diary of a childpornography suspect. 75 It has also kept the police from reading the account books of fraud artists.7 6 James Bidzos, who works for RSA Security, says he receives regular requests from police to help decipher
67. Charles L. Evans, Comment, U.S. Export Control of Encryption Software: Efforts
to Protect National Security Threaten the U.S. Software Industry's Ability to Compete in
Foreign Markets, 19 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 469, 473 (1994).
68. Commercial software companies are also beginning to exploit the screening feature
of cryptography. Jared Sandberg, New Software Filters Sexual, Racist Fare Circulatedon
the Internet, WALL ST. J., May 15, 1995 at B12 (introducing a product that blocks offensive
messages and searches for offensive sites).
69. Vic Sussman, Lost in Kafka Territory, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. Apr. 3, 1995, at
32.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Bulkeley, supra note 56, at Al.
73. Bulkeley, supra note 56, at Al.
74. Symposium, supra note 18, at 310-13. Scholars identify six general areas of difficulty in network law enforcement. Id. First, spatial landmarks do not exist. Id. at 331.
Second, criminal activity on a network is indistinguishable from lawful activity. Id. at 332.
Third, it is difficult to positively identify users over a network link. Id. at 333. Fourth,
traditional forms of proof will not work when the criminal's only contact with the scene of
the crime was over a network. Id. at 334. Fifth, the "hearts and minds" of computer users
are generally anti-government. Id. Sixth, current law does not sufficiently deter network
abuse. Id. at 336.
75. Bulkeley, supra note 56, at Al.
76. Bulkeley, supra note 56, at Al.
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encrypted information. 7 7 Law enforcement fears this is merely a shadow
78
of what awaits them.
Even before the age of asymmetric cryptography, the National Security Agency ("NSA) 7 9 saw a threat in private cryptography.8 0 Goaded
by the NSA, Congress categorized cryptography as an instrument of war
and made it subject to the same kind of export restrictions as hand grenades and fighter planes.8 1 Although the federal government has not yet
restricted the domestic use of encryption,8 2 it is promoting its own versions of digital security to wean the public away from private encryption.8 3 In the government systems, the key to the system is held in the
hands of an escrow agent who is charged with releasing it only in the
event of an authorized request.8 4
However, escrow proposals are fundamentally flawed.8 5 First, the
proposal was developed amidst an aura of secrecy and mistrust.8 6 Second, the resulting limit to surveillance does not warrant such elaborate
government access to communications.8 7 Third, ordinary citizens will
not use an escrow system voluntarily.8 8 Finally, without a better system of controls, an escrow system is prone to corruption.8 9 In fact, public
77. Bulkeley, supra note 56, at Al.
78. Benjamin Wittes, FBI, Justice Wary of Internet Crime;Info-Highwaymen Staying
Far Ahead of Law Enforcement, TEx. LAw., Oct. 24, 1994, at 8.
79. 50 U.S.C. §§ 401-32 (1988) (establishing the NSA).
80. JAMEs BAMFORD, THE PuzzLE PALAcE 351-55 (1982).
81. 22 C.F.R. § 121.1 (1993) (regulating hand-grenades and aircraft). The Arms Export Control Act includes, "cryptographic (including key management) systems, equipment,
assemblies, modules, integrated circuits, components or software with the capability of
maintaining secrecy or confidentiality of information . . . ." Id. § 121.01; see John Perry
Barlow, Jackboots on the Infobahn, WINED 2.04, Apr. 1994 at 16.
82. Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 103-414, 108
Stat. 4279 (1994) (signed into law on Oct. 25, 1994). Known as the 1994 Digital Telephony
Act, this law places an affirmative duty on communications service-providers to cooperate
with government interceptions. Id.
83. See generally U.S. to ProposeFederalAgency, supra note 2, at B6. The most prominent of these escrow proposals is the Clipper Chip, a semiconductor which scrambles
messages. FTP: Vince Cate's Cryptorebel and Cypherpunk Home Page, ftp'J/
furmint.netcar.cs.emu.edu; login: anonymous; password: e-mail address; directory: security, accessed Nov. 18, 1995.
84. Philip Elmer-DeWitt, Who Should Keep the Keys?, TIuE, Mar. 14, 1994, at 909-91.
85. Bruce Sterling, So, People We Have a Fight on OurHands, WMED 2.07, July 1994
(responding to pro-regulation arguments). On the other hand, organizations may need private escrow systems to prevent death or departure from exposing or permanently concealing information. See Don Clark, Motorola Plans to Help Firms Protect Data,WALL ST. J.,
May 15, at B12.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 2.
89. Hotz supra note 1, at Bi. The government maintains 900 separate databanks consisting of billions of personal records and the General Accounting Office documented cases
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reaction suggests that users will not accept any system managed by the
state.9 0
The question of government regulation of cryptography is a threshold issue on the path to the Information Age.
III.

AUTHOR'S ANALYSIS

The technology that is bringing the universe to our living rooms also
threatens to eliminate privacy as we know it. 91 This Comment argues
that direct state regulation of cryptography is an unconstitutional
abridgement of free speech. 92 Part IIIA of this analysis addresses those
arguments which classify cryptography as something other than
speech. 9 3 Part IIIB addresses arguments that concede that cryptography is speech, but attempt to force it into an exception. 9 4 Part IV reveals
the chilling effect of cryptography regulation on communications. Finally, Part V examines the market for cryptography and proposes that
market mechanics provide a workable solution to the conflict over infor95
mation security.
A.

CRYPTOGRAPHY AS NON-SPEECH

The line between electronic speech and traditional verbal speech is
fading into oblivion.9 6 As technology advances, the court's definition of
speech tends toward unpredictable results.9 7 Moreover, Congress has
considerable power to regulate individual conduct 8 and even greater
power to regulate goods and services.9 9 Consequently, the issue of the
status of encoded communication as "speech" is determinative.
where information from the FBI's National Criminal Information Center was sold to private parties; used to check up on political opponents and used to hunt down ex-girl friends.

Id.
90. Zelnick, supra note 64, at 32.
91. Lennon, supra note 4, at 470 (arguing the regulation of cryptography violates
Fourth Amendment).
92. See Stewart A. Baker, Don't Worry Be Happy: Why Clipperis Good ForYou, WIRED
2.06, June 1994, at 92 (outlining the general policy arguments in favor of government supplied encryption).
93. See generally, TRIBE & DORF, supra note 15, at 88.
94. TRIBE & DORF, supra note 15, at 89.
95. Symposium, supra note 18, at 342.
96. See Note, infra note 154, at 1083 (noting that all information will be reduced to a

single digital medium); see generally WnUAML
S. DAvis,

THE INFORMATION AGE

(William B.

Gruener and Marion E. Howe eds., 1979).
97. LAWRENCE TRiBE, A~mmcAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 827-30 (2d ed. 1988).
98. See generallyUnited States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (burning a draft card is

conduct and subject to government control).
99. See generally Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (using
Commerce Clause power to regulate interstate commerce to support civil rights laws).
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The distinction between speech and conduct is subject to scholarly
criticism because of its unpredictability.10 0 The Supreme Court defines
flag-burning 1 ' as speech, while wearing campaign buttons is defined as
conduct. 10 2 Regulators argue that cryptography is not speech at all. 10 3
The strength of this position is that encoded speech carries no message
on its surface; since it does not look like speech, it is not speech.
In Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English,10 4 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit struck down an attempt to put an Englishonly amendment in a State constitution.10 5 It held that a viewers' failure to understand a message simply means the communication is incomplete; it does not destroy that message's classification as speech.' 0 6 To
reach this conclusion, the Yniguez court first determined that speaking a
foreign language is not a form of unprotected conduct any more than
moving your mouth or typing on a keyboard.' 0 7 Importantly, the
Yniguez court stated foreign languages are speech by definition' 0 8 and
speech "in any language is still speech." 10 9 Using a foreign language involves the same fundamental choices as choosing words in a sentence." x0
The Yniguez court held that a state could not prohibit the personal choice
of an entire vocabulary nor even a single word."'
Cryptography's similarity to a foreign language is unmistakable.
Like a foreign language, unintelligible symbols can have a meaning, but
only for those who understand the language. The sign language used by
the deaf has little meaning for the unskilled, but carries the entire range
of human emotion." 2 Using cryptography is like adopting a private language, "spoken" only by those who know the proper key. People send
cards on birthdays, place calls to colleagues and send facsimiles to employees. Choosing to do each of these things in cryptographic language
100. TRIBE, supra note 97, at 827.

101. See generally Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (burning an American flag is
speech and receives constitutional protection).
102. See generally Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973) (wearing political buttons is conduct in the government workplace).
103. Bulkeley, supra note 56, at Al.
104. 42 F.3d 1217, 1231 (9th Cir. 1994).
105. Id. at 1220.
106. Id. at 1231.
107. Id. at 1230.
108. Yniguez, 42 F.3d at 1230.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Yniguez, 42 F.3d at 1230. In Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971), the
Supreme Court endorsed a speaker's right to choose to say "fuck the draft," instead of some
other expression of the same idea. The Cohen Court took the position that a government
cannot "forbid the use of words without running the risk of suppressing ideas." Cohen, 403
U.S. at 26.
112. TRME, supra note 97, at 833.
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does not make these messages less important. For the government to
insist on a translation of each message simply because it does not understand the language is patently unreasonable. Simply because cryptography is a computer-based language, the courts should not strip it of
1 13
constitutional protection.
Another non-speech argument is that cryptography is a mechanical
process rather than a form of speech. Theoretically, cryptography adds
nothing to the message by putting readable material through an operation which makes it unreadable. 1" 4 In a human sense, however, the
transformation gives the message security and thus, influences its author. 115 The public availability of a message determines what a person
reveals. The prudent person will presume that unencrypted messages
are as public as a billboard and will restrain his expression accordingly.
The creation of the message and the use of cryptography are inseparable.
1 16
A similar issue faced the Supreme Court in Kovacs v. Cooper.
The Court decided that the First Amendment protected the ideas transmitted by a loudspeaker, but that it did not protect the level of noise the
loudspeaker produced. 1 17 In Kovacs, however, the Court focused on the
intrusive nature of the loudspeaker and the protection of private
homes. 1 8 Cryptography, on the other hand, does not pose any kind of
invasion.
Moreover, cryptography requires the willing use of a key and thus
implies an element of consent. Because asymmetric systems consist of a
public key and a private key, 119 they create two filters for incoming
messages. 1 20 The decision to view a message rests entirely with the
1
receiver. 21

In Sable Communications,Inc. v. FCC, 122 the Court addressed this
consent issue when it struck down a prohibition on dial-a-porn services
because the listener had to take affirmative steps to hear the
message. 12 3 E-mail requires even greater affirmative steps to communi113. Yniguez, 42 F.3d at 1230.
114. Berkovits, supra note 6, at 849.

115. Lennon, supra note 4, at 483.
116. 336 U.S. 77, 86-87 (1949).

117. Id. at 85.
118. Id. at 87.
119. Berkovits, supra note 6, at 849.
120. Berkovits, supra note 6, at 851.
121. See Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n,
492 U.S. 115, 128 (1989) (noting that placing a telephone call prevents the unintended
surprises of pervasive mediums like radio).
122. 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
123. Id. at 121.
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cate than in Sable, and cryptography goes a step beyond this. 124 Cryptography creates an unmistakable layer of consent. Therefore, unlike
the situation in Kovacs, cryptography does not create a need for protective regulations to preserve the rights of others.
Undeniably, cryptography is a form of speech. A decision to use a
12 5
code is one of the fundamental choices that underlie all expression.
Cryptography provides a form of security which directly alters language
choices.' 2 6 In addition, the affirmative conduct of the user creates a level
of consent which separates cryptography from intrusive expression. Accordingly, definitions of speech that attempt to exclude cryptography fail.

B. THE
1.

EXCEPTION ARGUMENT

EstablishedSpeech Restrictions

Beyond the issue of whether cryptography is speech, arguments
could be advanced to limit these systems based on reasonable time, place
and manner restrictions. 12 7 The unreadable nature of encoded messages
means that these standards are a poor fit for cryptography. 128 The determinative question will be the legal status of the electronic networks
where the systems operate. 129 While that issue lies beyond the scope of
this Comment, it is possible to discuss cryptography in a public forum as
well as a limited public forum.
i. Public Forum
The level of restriction a state may place on speech varies depending
on nature of the forum.130 Exchanges which take place on a public way,
such as in a street, receive a great deal of constitutional protection. 13 1 In
124. Id. at 127-28; Jared Sandberg, New Software Filters Sexual, Racist Fare on In-

ternet, WALL ST. J., Sept. 20, at B12. SurfWatch Software offers a service which provides
the addresses of offensive material. Id. Each month the company scans the Internet for
words such as "pornography" and "pedophilia." Id.

125. Yniguez, 42 F.3d at 1231.
126. See Lennon, supra note 4, at 471.
127. See generally Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (banning all leaflets in
an attempt to control litter was too burdensome on speech to be constitutional); Konigsberg
v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 49-51 (1961), reh'g denied, 368 U.S. 869 (1961).

Although the KonigsbergCourt held that the freedom of speech is not "an unlimited license
to talk," Justice Black took the position that the words of the First Amendment indicate an
underlying absolute freedom. Id. at 59-60 (Black, J., dissenting).
128. TRmBE & DORF, supra note 15, at 88.

129. Edward J. Naughton, Is Cyberspace a Public Forum? Computer Bulletin Boards,
Free Speech, and State Action, 81 GEo. L. J. 409, 414 (1992).
130. TRIBE, supra note 97, at 791-92.
131. See generally Hague v. C.I.O, 307 U.S. 496 (1939) (holding that the public's use of
streets for debate is an ancient form of liberty).
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a computer network, however, the limits of physical space evaporate. 1 32
Events which ordinarily occurred on the street take place between ma133
chines scattered all over the globe.
34
Presumably, with the Internet doubling in size every year,1 it will
13 5
soon earn the title of public forum.
Any restrictions on speech in a
public forum must serve a compelling public interest and be narrowly
tailored to serve that interest. 136 The argument is that wide availability
of cryptographic technology creates a compelling threat to the safety of
American citizens because it erodes the ability of government to gather
evidence. 137 However, cryptography functions like a ski-mask, only obscuring a robber's identity; it is not inherently dangerous.' 38 Further,
misuse of cryptography does not eliminate the ability of police to gather
13 9
evidence; it only prevents them from understanding it.
Furthermore, no regulation could ever be sufficiently tailored to the
goal of crime prevention 140 to survive constitutional scrutiny. 141 A cryptography regulation would attach equally to any sort of speech the user
encoded, from pornography to political debate. In a public forum, the
government's limited interest cannot support cryptography regulation.
ii.

Limited Public Forum

In a limited public forum, the government creates or authorizes the
14 2
public's use and therefore, it has a greater power to regulate speech.
The regulation must be reasonable in light of the purpose of the forum; it
must be viewpoint neutral and it must leave open alternate channels of
expression. 14 3 Advancing the same safety interests, the fit between reg132. Teri A. Cutrera, The Constitution in Cyberspace: The FundamentalRights of Computer Users, 60 UMKC L. Rev. 139, 142 (1991).
133. Naughton, supra note 129, at 413.
134. Survey, The Accidental Superhighway, ECONOMIT, July 1, 1995, at 3.
135. See Eric C. Jensen, An Electronic Soapbox: Computer Bulletin Boards and the
First Amendment, 39 FED. Comm. L. J. 217 (1987).
136. In Brandenburgv. Ohio, the Supreme Court reversed a conviction under a criminal
anarchy law where the speaker advocated racial violence in a television interview. 395
U.S. 444, 446 (1969) (per curiam). The BrandenburgCourt stated that for the government
to criminalize speech, the speaker would have to intentionally incite lawless action. Id. at
447.
137. Bulkeley, supra note 56, at Al.
138. Bacard, WVW Page, supra note 59.
139. Lennon, supra note 4, at 473.
140. Nina Schuyler, Bugs in the System, The FBI Wants to Monitor Traffic on the Information Superhighway, CAL. LAw., July 1994. at 149 (noting that the government seems to
want access to all information).
141. LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMiucAN CONsTITuTIoNAL LAw 830 (2d ed. 1988).
142. Id. at 831.
143. Id.
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ulating cryptography and crime prevention suggests the same police
power argument for regulation in a limited public forum.144
In International Society for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 1 45 the
Supreme Court established a yardstick for reasonableness in a limited
public forum. 146 It upheld a regulation prohibiting the solicitation of donations in an airport terminal because the regulation promoted safe traffic flow in an airline terminal. 14 7 While not the most narrowly tailored
approach, the Krishna court reasoned that in this non-traditional forum,
the regulation only needed to reflect the purpose of the forum and exhibit
viewpoint neutrality. 148 The focus of the court was the purpose of the
14 9
terminal and in that light, the regulation was reasonable.
The use of cryptography on the Internet is distinguishable from the
airport solicitation in Krishna. The purpose of the Internet and other
computer networks is to carry information.' 5 0 While restricting panhandlers may be reasonably related to getting commuters safely through
an airport, regulating the only source of protection on the network will
not speed the flow of information. It may create such weaknesses that
users will avoid the networks when transferring data.' 5 ' Restrictions on
the amount and type of private communications an individual enjoys is
5 2
antithetical to free and public exchange.'
As to the alternate channels, the approach of complete communications integration means that improperly conceived, drafted or implemented regulations will result in utter exposure.' 5 3 This underlines the
reality that in either forum, the presence of government regulation
54
places all our communications at risk.'
IV.

PRIOR RESTRAINT AND CHILLING EFFECT

Independent of the forum, 155 the least tolerable restrictions on
speech occur when government attempts to prevent the expression of
144. Id. at 982.
145. 112 S. Ct. 2701 (1992).
146. Id. at 2703.
147. Id. at 2701.
148. Id. at 2704.
149. Id.
150. Gordon & McKenzie, supra note 63, at 179.
151. Bulkeley, supra note 56, at Al.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. See Note, The Message in the Medium: The First Amendment on the Information
Superhighway, 107 HARv. L. REV. 1062, 1083 (1994) (arguing the case for uniform treatment of all telecommunications).
155. See generally Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). In Schenck, a unanimous Supreme Court held that pamphlets urging recruits to oppose the draft rose to the
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particular ideas. 156 Prior restraints strike at the heart of our First
Amendment freedoms. 15 7 Because encrypted communications are unquestionably speech, cryptography regulations are a form of prior
restraint.
To prove the necessity of a prior restraint, the state carries a heavy
burden. 15 8 An informed public is the primary shield against misgovernment, 15 9 and the government must show that the threat to the nation's
well-being posed by the publication of the idea outweighs this safeguard.' 60 The indirect connection between a stream of unreadable
ciphertext and a vague threat of a national crime wave will not support a
prior restraint. 16 1 The government could never carry this burden.
In the only case ever directly upholding a prior restraint, United
States v. Progressive,16 2 the District Court for the Western District of
Wisconsin enjoined the publication of a magazine article describing how
to build an atomic bomb. 163 The Progressivecourt allowed the first prior
restraint in this nation's history after it balanced the risk to the human
race against the magazine's First Amendment rights.' 6 4 The oddity of
the Progressive case suggests that the threat posed by the information
must be cataclysmic. 1 65 The government interest in cryptography, however, is considerably less than the survival of our species.
level of a "clear and present" danger because of the "character of the act [and the] circumstances in which it [was] done." Id. at 52.
156. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936). In Grosjean, Louisiana
enacted a tax on advertising receipts of newspapers. Id. at 234. Finding this tax to be
unconstitutional, the Grosjean Court took the First Amendment to be a clear rejection of
England's historical system of prior restraints. Id. at 249.
157. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976). In Nebraska Press, the
Supreme Court struck down an injunction on newspaper publication of a murderer's
confession.
Id. at 562. Although the publication might infringe upon the ability to receive a fair trial,
the NebraskaPress court held that the state would have to show definite harm to merit an
injunction. Id. at 563.
158. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 558 (1975). Without actually seeing the production, the Chattanooga, Tennessee city council banned the production
of the musical Hairbecause it contained nudity. Id. at 548-49. Justice Douglas took the
position in his dissent that the Constitution prohibits all censorship, no matter how brief.
Id. at 563 (Douglas J., dissenting).
159. Grosjean, 297 U.S. at 245-50.
160. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931) (stating that publishing the dates and
times of military operations would justify a prior restraint).

161. New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 715 (1971) (denying an injunction
where publication would embarrass the executive branch).
162. 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979)

163.
164.
165.
volves

Id. at 994.
Id. at 996.
Id. at 995 (noting that the consequence of error with regard to atomic bombs in"life itself").
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While direct regulation is generally unconstitutional, government
attempts to impose self-censorship are also unconstitutional. 16 6 In New
York Times v. Sullivan,167 the Supreme Court addressed the issue of
self-censorship "chilling" newspaper reporting. 168 Any errors, even unintentional ones, gave a plaintiff grounds to sue and win a libel action
under the existing libel standard. 16 9 Citing a "profound national commitment"1 70 to open, uninhibited public debate, the Sullivan Court
found that a free press could not operate under such a continual threat of
171
civil action.
Restricting cryptography will favor eavesdroppers, snoops and
thieves to the point where it will unconstitutionally censor speech. With
machine-driven searches, anyone can continuously scour millions of bits
of information. 172 In Sullivan, the guarantees of the First Amendment
mandated that the Court construe the libel laws to prevent indirect censorship. 1 73 Surveillance technology is eroding these same guarantees. 174 If cryptography is to restore the constitutional balance, it must
be free of the dead hand of government regulation.
V. A SOLUTION
The same technology that makes it possible to scan an encyclopedia
in seconds vastly expands the government's power to monitor our
speech 17 5 and threaten our constitutional freedoms. 176 Law enforcement agencies fear cryptography will counter its current advantage or
worse, tip the balance in favor of lawlessness. 17 7 On the other hand,
sophisticated private cryptography is an inescapable necessity if computer networks are ever to rise to their potential. The solution lies in
letting these divergent interests compete in the marketplace.
166.
167.
168.
169.

TRIE, supra note 97, at 946.
367 U.S. 254 (1964)
Id.
Id.

170. Id. at 256.

171. Id.
172. Hotz, supra note 1, at B1.
173. New York Times, 367 U.S. at 258.
174. Thomas J. Emerson, T FIRST AMENDMENT IN Tfm YEAR 2000, THE FuTuR OF
Ouo LMERTiEs 70-71 (Stephen C. Halpren ed., 1982).
175. Wittes, supra note 78, at 8. In the days of paper mail, "[individuals] were like little
mammals scurrying ... between the legs of the giant dinosaurs. But now, the government
dinosaur has acquired the nervous system of a ferret." Id.
176. Lennon, supra note 4, at 467, 467 n.2.
177. Hotz, supra note 1, at B1.
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THE MARKETPLACE

A marketplace for any commodity is made up of all the exchanges
between suppliers and consumers. 178 This interaction serves three vital
functions in a society. 179 First, it mediates the conflict between those
who have a commodity and those who want it.1s ° Second, the marketplace allocates limited resources in an efficient manner.1 8 1 Finally, mar82
kets provide people with vital feedback about the decisions they make.1
When the marketplace is composed of a large number of suppliers; a
large number of consumers; and trades in a fungible good, it is competitive and serves its social functions efficiently.' 8 3 Importantly, competitive markets develop wherever there is a demand-with, without, or in
spite of government initiatives.
B. THE

MARKET FOR CRYPTOGRAPHY

Cryptography systems can take the form of hardware, like semiconductor chips imbedded in appliances, or software which runs as a program.'8 4 Cryptography software has several advantages over hardware
systems. Software is flexible enough to work with a variety of machines
and can respond to an assortment of user needs.' 8 5 It can be easily inspected to make sure it does what it claims.' 8 6 Most importantly, since
software is cheap to produce and distribute, sellers can disseminate innovations quickly.' 8 7 These advantages mean that software cryptography
systems will eclipse hardware systems for the foreseeable future.'8 8
Similar to the software market, the cryptography market has all the
elements to be a purely competitive market. Every single one of the millions of personal computers around the world is a potential factory.' 8 9
Every computer, telephone and facsimile machine is a potential consumer.190 The rapidly expanding reach of computer networks means the
market for cryptography is vast.191 With manufacturers able to jump in
178. ROBERT P. THOMAs, EcoNoMIcs: PRINCIPALs AND APPLICATIONS 86-87 (1990).

179. Id. at 104.
180. Id.
181. Id.

182. Id.
183. THoMAS, supra note 178, at 101.
184. Don't Tell it to the Spartans, supra note 7, at 81. Hardware and software com-

bined, the market for cryptography products will reach $3 billion by 1999. Clark, supra
note 85, at B12.
185. Don't Tell it to the Spartans, supra note 7, at 81.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. BoYv, supra note 46, at 48.
190. Id.
191. Gordon & McKenzie, supra note 63, at 180.
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and out of the market effortlessly, no one supplier nor single buyer can
substantially influence the market price. 192 There are few distribution
problems on computer networks. 193 Further, the implementation of any
one cryptographic program is indistinguishable from any other and
therefore, consumers can change systems without penalty.' 9 4 Consequently, the market for software-based cryptography is almost ideally
competitive.
The appeal of the marketplace solution is its effect on the underlying
commodity, information security. First, open markets allow those who
desire security to obtain it in some form. 19 5 A large number of producers
will produce a variety of products and distribute them to wide assortment of consumers facing different problems all over the world. 196 Second, the cryptography marketplace efficiently allocates the time and
talent which creates it. 19 7 Those consumers who desire the most protection will hire those mathematicians and programmers who show the
most ability. 19 8 Government, which invariably possess more resources
than private individuals, can also pursue its goals. 1 9 9 Further, the ease
of market entry allows any "weekend programmer" a chance to innovate
and explore for customers in the market.
Finally, the cryptography market provides manufacturers and consumers with information about their decisions. Users send a message
through their purchases to producers about the level of protection they
desire. 20 0 Manufacturers respond by developing new cryptography products or by eliminating existing ones. 2 01 An uncontrolled cryptography
market allows citizens to feel safe, nurtures innovation and allows for
rapid responses to changing threats.

192. See THoMAs, supra note 178, at 87-88 (noting competitive markets cannot have
significant barriers to entry or exit).
193. See id. at 148.
194. See id. at 88 (noting the ability to switch between goods without significant penalty
is essential in a competitive market).
195. THOMAS, supra note 178, at 88.
196. See id. at 149 (emphasizing the importance of technology to suppliers).

197. Id. at 88-89.
198. See BoYD, supra note 46, at 52.
199. Id. Rather than compete against its citizens, the FBI is currently pursuing an
Orwellian scheme to build government access into the nation's phone network. John Markoff, FBI Wants Advanced Systems to Vastly Increase Wire Tapping,NEW YoRK TuMEs, Nov.
2, 1995 at Al.
200. THoMAs, supra note 178, at 101.
201. Id. at 10.
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FLAWS IN THE MARKETPLACE SOLUTION

The marketplace alternative has two potential problems. 20 2 First,
the currently ideal market may not always maintain its integrity. Sudden changes in availability of the related hardware, compatibility or in
the nature of the expected threats might leave some consumers dangerously exposed. 20 3 Unexpected technological breakthroughs or roadblocks might drive the less resourceful producers out of the market and
limit the number of options open to the public. 20 4 However, shifts in the
market are, at least in part, created by the market 20 5 and the cryptography industry should be able to absorb temporary imbalances.
The second problem is whether cryptographic security has evolved
from a desire into a need.20 6 The word need suggests that for this resource, there is an absolute acceptable minimum. 20 7 If an individual
should fall below this level, society is willing to make a sacrifice in order
to restore that level. 20 8 If programs which automate cryptographic attacks, like SATAN, 20 9 have brought us to a place where any unencrypted
message is essentially open to the public, 2 10 the question is whether we
are willing to make a sacrifice in order to establish a minimum level of
cryptographic protection. The threat forces us to insist that our banks,
our hospitals, and our schools protect themselves in order to protect us.
If its absence directly restricts our ability to express ourselves, cryptography becomes a necessity and a right.
202. Id. at 101.
203. Id. at 181.
204. THoMAs, supra note 178, at 312-13.
205. Id. at 8-12 (stating markets are the result of scarcity).
206. Id. at 92-94.
207. Id. at 92
208. Id. at 93-94.
209. Sussman, supra note 47, at 12. Weaknesses in network software appear with some
regularity. See e.g., Netscape Reassures Users Internet Software is Safe, WALL ST. J., Sept.
20, 1995, at B10. SATAN automates the techniques hackers use to identify and exploit

weaknesses in networks. Sussman, supra note 47, at 12. Other programs such as LocalPeek, NetMinder and Traffic Watch allow network managers to eavesdrop at will. Ba-

card, WWW Page, supra note 59. Wpcrack, designed to break WordPerfect's encryption
system, is available at FTP: ftp.dsi.unimi.it; login: anonymous; password: e-mail address;
directory: /pub/security/crypt/code, accessed Apr. 28, 1995.
To counter the flaws in its system, Netscape began a policy of rewarding those users
who find bugs. Joan E. Rigdon, Netscape is Putting a Price on the Head of Any Big Bug

Found in Web Browser, WALL ST. J., Oct. 11, 1995, at B8. In addition, Netscape plans to
make its software compatible with the United States government multilevel information
security system, code-named Fortezza. U.S. CryptographyAdopted, WALL ST. J., Oct. 11,
1995, at B8; see also, Mykotroax Announces Award of High Grade Crypto ProcessorProgram, Bus. WinE, Oct. 2, 1995, at 109.

210. BoYD, supra note 46, at 49.
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V. CONCLUSION

Surveillance technology threatens to eliminate private commuimcation in the near future and to unconstitutionally abridge free speech.
Cryptography promises to provide an inexpensive and adaptable shield
against this intrusion. Moreover, encryption technology gives business
the equipment necessary to develop on the networks. On the other hand,
government fears that terrorists and criminals will exploit this technology, and so seeks to regulate its use. The conflict over cryptography requires us to balance our fears against our beliefs.
The solution lies in putting control of cryptography in the marketplace. The nature of the market assures that it can produce a variety of
affordable and effective cryptographic systems. Left to itself, this industry will foster originality and provide a flexible response to new threats.
Structural inequalities in the cryptography market, which might leave
some people unprotected, have yet to appear. In the digital age, technology infringes on our ability to communicate and abridges our First
Amendment rights. Cryptography can restore that fundamental privacy
and it is an indivisible part of our freedom.
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